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Narrative Plausibility:
The Impact of Sequence
and Anchoring
David V. Canter, Ph.D., F.A.P.A., F.B.Ps.S.,
C.Psychol.,* Nicola Grieve, M.Sc., Catherine
Nicol, M.Sc., and Kelly Benneworth, M.Sc.
The perceived plausibility of suspect narratives is hypothe-
sized to be a product of more than logical evaluation.
Aspects of the narrative’s internal structure, notably the
extent to which it follows a canonical (or stereotypical)
sequence of events,may influence judged plausibility. Plau-
sibility may also be sensitive to external ‘‘anchors’’ that
activate relevant schema. To test these possibilities, varia-
tions of two suspect testimonies were created in accordance
with the model by Stein and Glenn (1979) of a stereotypical
story grammar, and the account byWagenaar, vanKoppen,
and Crombag (1993) of narrative anchoring. Subjects rated
the narrative account using a perceived plausibility scale
developed from pilot work. ANOVA revealed that criminal
anchoring in suspect statements, regardless of the crime
scenario, has a negative effect on the plausibility level.
Similarly, plausibility levels were lower when the statement
did not follow a temporal sequence of events. The implica-
tions for models of how people judge plausibility are dis-
cussed, as are the practical implications for legal contexts.
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There are many situations in which judgements of plausibility are made, ranging
from casual conversation to evidence heard in court during a criminal trial.
Although many of these judgements may be based on the logic of the account
that is heard, and the evidence it contains, it is possible that other cognitive
processes are involved. When accounts take the form of narratives, ‘‘descriptions
of connected events in order of happening’’ (Allen, 1969, p. 488), it is possible that
the judgement of plausibility derives from cognitive schema of the form and content
a trustworthy story should have.
Schemata for stories have been identified to explain how people comprehend and
remember spoken and written stories. For juries in particular, it has been argued,
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sense is made of the evidence by constructing ‘‘their own stories of the case’’ (Wiener,
Richmond, Seib, Rauch, & Hackney, 2002, p. 120). Further light may therefore be
shed on the processes that influence how plausible any story on offer may be by
examining the schemata on which people may draw and the constituents of those
schemata that may bemost influential in assessing how plausible a story is likely to be.
The constituents identified for such schemata usually consist of a typical internal
structure that a story is expected to have (Singer, 1990). These structures have been
elaborated as story grammars, for example by Thorndyke (1977). Following
Rumelhart (1975), it is claimed that typical stories have a set of components that
have a predictable sequence to them [StoryþSettingþThemeþPlotþResolu-
tion]. This structure is seen to exist independently of its linguistic content.
Thorndyke (1977) found that the existence of this structure facilitated under-
standing and recall of stories. The more an incoming text failed to match up with a
standard, well learned, structural hierarchy of goal-directed episode sequences, the
lower its comprehensibility and recall.
Other studies have also shown that story comprehension is facilitated when
stories are told in an order compatible with the standard sequence. Schwartz and
Flamer (1981) examined peoples’ memory for different versions of a story. In the
normal version, the stories were told in the sequence [StoryþSettingþThemeþ
PlotþResolution]. In a second version the theme of the story was moved to the end,
and in a third version the story sentences were completely randomized. Consistent
with story grammar analysis, people recalled the greatest number of story propositions
when the story was presented in the original as opposed to the randomized version.
Although models of story grammar are useful in developing an understanding of
story comprehension, crucial problems have been identified. One is that the models
provide only a simple characterization of a small class of discourses, namely single
goal, single protagonist stories (Thorndyke, 1977). In light of this, other approaches
to the representation of narrative information (such as Labov, 1972) have been
drawn on to broaden these simple models to cover more complex event sequences
and naturally occurring prose materials, that is, to narratives as opposed to stories.
Using an empirical, linguistic approach, Labov (1972) established a model of
narrative structure generated from informal oral narratives from New York, Black
English vernacular culture. In this model, a six-part structure of a fully formed
narrative is proposed (see Table 1).
Labov (1972) proposes that these six narrative clauses are temporally ordered,
occurring in a fixed canonical sequence. This sequence provides meaning for the
narrative, hence a change in the sequence of the clauses will result in a change in the
meaning of the narrative (Labov, 1972). Caron (1992) explains the power of this
Table 1. Canonical narrative structure, from Labov (1972)
Narrative clause Description
Abstract Initial summary of the story
Orientation Time, place, persons involved, situation, and activities involved in the story
Complicating action Central main event, the point of interest, and the behavioural reaction
associated with this event
Evaluation Attitude of the narrator and the importance of the complicating action
Resolution The outcome of the complicating action
Coda Bridging the gap between the narrative and the present time
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sequence by claiming it accords ‘‘with our knowledge of the normal order of things
in the world in which we live’’ (Caron, 1992, p. 162). A narrative structured
according to Labov’s (1972) model will possess a sequence that relates to this
‘‘normal order’’ and will thus correspond to relevant activated schema of similar
known events. It will therefore be easier to comprehend and remember than a
narrative that is not structured in this way (Robinson & Hawpe, 1986).
Following criticism that Labov’s structure of temporal components did not allow
for individual accounts of behavioural reactions (Edwards, 1997) and of the event
itself in the complicating action component, Stein and Glenn (1979) constructed a
revised model of Labov’s original structure. The model suggested that the ‘‘com-
plicating action’’ should be divided into more components that are comparable.
Consequently Stein and Glenn proposed a model, which encompassed a setting and
an episode component (Table 2).
The question therefore arises as to whether judgements of the plausibility of a
narrative will be influenced by similar processes. If people have a schema of what the
canonical sequence of a narrative should be, do they draw on this to judge whether
an account is suspect because it does not accord with their expectations? The
assumption here is that, just as the narrative schema provides a basis for remember-
ing a story, it also provides a form of sequence template against which ‘‘true’’ stories
are compared. Accounts that are seen to deviate from this template would therefore
be hypothesized to be regarded as less plausible. Pennington and Hastie (1986)
explored the influence of temporality on the perception of truth in a fictitious
murder trial. The prosecution and defence lawyers presented a mock jury with
identical information in either a chronological or randomized order. It was found
that testimonies presented in a random order, particularly by the defence lawyer,
were disbelieved, whereas testimonies that were recalled in the same order as the
experience were found more coherent and plausible.
NARRATIVE STRUCTURE AND
CRIMINAL ANCHORING
A narrative’s structure is an aspect of its internal organization that is independent of
its context or its particular content. There are, however, also likely to be external
Table 2. The narrative structure of Stein and Glenn (1979)
Narrative clause Description
Setting
Abstract Summary of the actions to come, sets the tone of the account
Setting Immediate physical, social, and temporal context pertaining to the
development of the episode
Episode
Initiating event Disruption in the initial equilibrium, key event on which narrative
episode focuses evoking response from protagonist
Attempt Overt actions to achieve goal prompted by the initiating events
Consequence Subsequent success or failure of the attempt, attainment or
nonattainment of goal
Reaction Expression of protagonist’s feelings about the goal attainment,
provides an evaluation of the consequence
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factors that the narrative may connect with that can provide a basis for judging
plausibility. Wagenaar et al. (1993) identified these external connections as ‘‘an-
chors’’, claiming they were of great importance in determining ‘‘the plausibility of
the stories presented by the prosecution and defence’’ (Wagenaar et al., 1993, p. 33).
They described ‘‘anchors’’ as common-sense rules that are generally expected to be
true. Anchors often take the form of unquestioned assumptions about how people
behave in certain situations. In the case of suspect testimonies, these assumptions
may be stereotypes that anchor the narratives in question to commonly held
perceptions of criminality, for example ‘‘once a thief always a thief’’ and ‘‘drug
abusers are always thieves’’ (Wagenaar, 1995).
Wagenaar’s interesting claims have not been subject to systematic empirical test,
but have been argued from example. Nor has the power of such external aspects of
narratives been compared with the internal constituents that may derive from the
narrative’s structure. It is therefore appropriate to include anchors as a treatment
condition in experiments that also explore the effects of narrative sequence. The
combination of both internal and external constituents of narratives in one experi-
mental design provides the basis for a model of the processes that underlie
judgements of narrative plausibility.
PILOT STUDY
Method
In order to test the feasibility of using an experimental approach in a domain that has
previously relied mainly on qualitative research, and to develop a quantitative
measure of plausibility, a pilot study was carried out.
Participants
A total of 80 (60 female and 20male) undergraduate students from the University of
Liverpool volunteered to participate in the study. The mean age of participants was
22 years of age and the range was between 18 and 35 years.
Procedure
Two fictional suspect testimonies, one for a homicide and one for a burglary
scenario, were created using the model by Stein and Glenn (1979) of narrative
structure. Both statements were based on genuine testimonies, but the stimuli were
artificially assembled to guarantee the inclusion of events representing all of the
narrative clauses present in the model: abstract, setting, initiating event, attempt,
consequence, and reaction.
In the first version of these statements, the narrative clauses were presented in the
order specified by the model of Stein and Glenn (1979). In a second version, the
sentences corresponding to each clause were presented in reverse order (i.e.
reaction, consequence, attempt, initiating event, setting, and abstract) but were
otherwise unchanged. Care was taken to ensure that the statements were still
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syntactically correct following the rearrangement so that both accounts were
linguistically appropriate.
In a third version of these statements, a ‘‘criminal anchor’’ was incorporated into
the narrative. In the burglary scenario, the narrative abstract was altered from ‘‘it
was nothing to do with me, I have never been in trouble before’’ to ‘‘it was nothing to
do with me, I’ve been in trouble for burglary before and would never get involved
again’’. This introduced the anchor of ‘‘once a thief always a thief ’’ stipulated by
Wagenaar (1995). The anchor in the burglary scenario seemed quite obvious
therefore a more subtle manipulation was introduced for the homicide scenario in
order to examine determine whether it was still powerful when it was not so obvious.
In the homicide scenario, the setting of the narrative was changed from ‘‘it happened
late on Tuesday evening when me and my mate were coming home from work’’ to
‘‘it happened late on Tuesday evening when me and my mate were coming home
from the pub’’. This was thought to inspire a stereotypical notion of drunkenness
and aggression.
Each participant was asked to read one statement and record their opinions of it
on a questionnaire designed to gauge perceptions of the perceived reality, truth,
plausibility, coherence, and typicality of the statement. Questions were presented in
both an open and a closed format in order to elicit precise and detailed responses.
Participants were also asked to give their opinions on the structure of the statement
as a whole.
Results
Experimental scenarios are always subject to the possibility that they are not
perceived as genuine or that reactions to them will not generalize to other contexts.
However, in the present case the scenarios did take the form of brief simulated
statements of the form that police may record during an investigation. The context
of this study within a Centre for Investigative Psychology that is known to study
statements obtained by the police further enhanced the respondents’ expectations
that these could be genuine statements. The participants’ response to the material as
genuine is born out by the fact that 82% of the participants declared that they
believed the statements were genuine (‘‘real’’) accounts of a suspect’s account of
their involvement in a criminal event. This qualitative data did not allow for
examination of the differences between those who believed the statements were
genuine or not but, that is clearly an interesting area for future research.
With regard to narrative sequence there did appear to be an impact upon the
perceived plausibility, truthfulness, realism, and coherence of the statements. When
asked to provide reasons why such judgements were made, participants who rated
the canonically sequenced statements as more plausible gave explanations such as
‘‘the account [ . . . ] seemed logical in that it summarizes what went on in a clear time
sequence’’, and ‘‘the explanation is simple but consistent’’. These can be compared
with comments on the non-sequenced statements such as ‘‘doesn’t follow through
the incident, jumps from after the incident back to the beginning’’ and ‘‘he (the
suspect) says one thing and half way seems to change his story, it doesn’t add up’’.
Similarly, indications of why the statements that contained an anchor were not rated
as plausible were comments such as ‘‘he’s been in trouble before—a leopard doesn’t
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change its spots’’ and ‘‘he’s been in trouble before for the same thing!’’. Therefore,
although respondents only read one statement each and the modifications were only
a small component of the statements, there were clear indications that respondents
were sensitive to these aspects of the statements.
In addition to these results, chi-square analysis showed significant associations
between narrative scenario and plausibility, and narrative scenario and coherence
(2¼ 14.76, df¼ 7, p< 0.05 and 2¼ 16.36, df¼ 7, p< 0.05 respectively). Exam-
ination of the results confirmed the direction of this significance, with statements
adhering to the model by Stein and Glenn (1979) of narrative structure being rated
as plausible and coherent more frequently than statements that did not follow this
structure. Also, statements that did not contain a criminal anchor were rated as
plausible and coherent more frequently than those that did contain an anchor. The
associations found between the ratings of plausibility, truth, realism, and coherence
suggested that when people form a judgement about the ‘‘goodness’’ of a narrative,
all of these variables are used in order to decide whether it is a valid account, or
plausible version, of the events in question.
On closer examination of the responses to the pilot study, it was evident that a
number of concepts relating to plausibility were being drawn upon in order to assess
the statement. Therefore, ten items were constructed to form a response set, which
would amalgamate the related themes that emerged from the pilot study. The
response form consisted of ten questions, each a ten-point Likert scale, to indicate
the degree of agreement of the participant with each of the ten descriptions
describing the statement. The items of the Likert scale were as follows: true,
convincing, logical, coherent, consistent, plausible, reliable, honest, sound, and
credible. Each statement could therefore receive a maximum overall plausibility
score of 100 (by scoring ten on all ten questions) and a minimum plausibility score
of ten (by scoring one on all ten questions). This ten-item scale was used in
subsequent studies. It is given in Appendix B.
STUDY 2
Method
Participants
Again 80 undergraduate students (48 females and 32 males) between the ages of 18
and 28 (mean age 22) from the University of Liverpool volunteered to participate in
this study.
Procedure
Each participant was provided with one of the suspect statements and was asked to
read the statement carefully and record their opinions of it on the ten-item
plausibility scale. On this scale, a score of 1 indicated extremely low level of the
variable in question, and a score of 10 indicated maximum levels (see Appendix B).
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Reliability of the Scale
In order to test the homogeneity of the scale, Cronbach’s  coefficients were
calculated for the responses from the 80 participants across the eight different
narrative conditions. It was found that consistency was high (¼ 0.91) among all of
the variables, thus indicating the reliability of the scale. The contribution of each
item of the scale to the overall reliability was also measured. The  scores for the
scale with each item deleted were never below 0.89, indicating an almost equal
contribution from each item to the reliability of the scale as a whole. This high
degree of homogeneity for a set of items that have high face validity also therefore
lends support to the validity of the scale as a whole.
STUDY 3
Having established the acceptability of the statements and the reliability of the
measure of judged plausibility, a further quantitative study was carried out to test the
main hypotheses of the effect of narrative structure and anchoring and the relative
influence of these two aspects.
Method
Participants
In order to gain a sample more representative of a real jury selection, participants
were randomly approached over a period of 3 days in Liverpool City centre. 80
participants (36 males and 44 females) from 18 to 63 years of age (mean age 36)
volunteered to take part in the study. Participants were from a broad range of
occupational and educational backgrounds, which was felt to replicate the variance
that would exist in a jury selection.
Procedure
The statements used in the pilot study, given in Appendix A, were presented to
respondents and they were asked to rate them using the ten-item plausibility scale in
Appendix B. Each participant was given one statement, and asked to read it carefully.
S/he was then asked to record his/her opinions of it on the plausibility scale, by
circling the response (1–10) they felt best described the statement in question.
Results
Results from a three-way ANOVA, in Table 3, only show a significant main effect of
anchoring (F(1, 72)¼ 5.7, p< 0.05) on the perceived plausibility of the statements.
Themeans indicate that overall the statements that didnot contain an anchor received
higher plausibility scores than those that did. There was no significant main effect for
sequence or the different scenarios, although generally, contrary to the hypothesis, the
non-sequenced scenarios were rated more plausible than the sequenced ones. This
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unexpected result relates to the significant interaction between type of crime depicted
in the scenario and narrative sequence (F(1, 72)¼ 9.5, p< 0.05).
The interaction between scenario and the other treatments is revealed by con-
sideration of the sets of means for each scenario. As hypothesized the means for the
burglary scenario, displayed in Table 4, show that the sequenced statements are
more plausible than the non-sequenced and the non-anchored are more plausible
than the anchored statements. In combination the two treatments produce a marked
effect such that the anchored, non-sequenced statements are on average below the
midway point for the scale, suggesting a general scepticism about the statements. In
contrast, the sequenced non-anchored statements, with a mean of 70.0, are in the
top third of the plausibility range, indicating some belief in the statements. The
effect of the treatments, especially in combination, therefore appears considerable.
As can be seen in Table 4 the homicide statements that did not adhere to the
sequence of Stein and Glenn (1979), were rated as more plausible than the sequen-
ced statements. This effect is so marked that the non-sequenced and anchored
statement is seen as marginally more plausible on average than the sequenced and
anchored statement, suggesting that the process assumed to be part of the non-
sequencing has masked the effect of the anchor. Either there was something about
the content of that scenario that confounded the effects being studied or there was
some aspect of the way the material was sequenced that confused the issues.
Overall, though the anchoring conditions here had the greatest relative effect on
decisions of plausibility, contributing to 6.2% of the explained variance in plausi-
bility scores.
Table 3. Three-way ANOVA results for study 3
Source df Mean square F Significance
Crime 1 112.81 0.36 NS
Sequence 1 0.012 0.00 NS
Anchor 1 1776.61 5.67 0.020*
Crime  sequence 1 2989.01 9.54 0.003**
Crime  anchor 1 30.01 0.09 NS
Sequence  anchor 1 94.61 0.30 NS
Crime  sequenceanchor 1 891.11 2.84 NS
Error 72 313.29
Total 80
Corrected total 79
*p<0.05, **p<0.005.
Table 4. Mean plausibility scores for the burglary and homicide statements for study 3
No anchor Anchor Total
Burglary
Sequenced 70.0 (10.9) 68.2 (17.3) 138.2
Non-sequenced 66.0 (17.1) 47.1 (24.2) 113.1
Total 136.0 115.3
Homicide
Sequenced 65.6 (18.0) 52.9 (25.9) 118.5
Non-sequenced 73.3 (8.1) 69.6 (12.1) 142.9
Total 138.9 122.5
Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
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Discussion
It is evident from the results that the inclusion of an anchor in both the homicide and
burglary statements decreased their perceived levels of plausibility. However, the
effect of sequence was dependent on the scenario involved: a reversal in the
sequence of narrative clauses only resulted in a decrease in plausibility levels in
the burglary condition. This shows that narrative sequence does have an impact on
plausibility, and suggests that in the homicide condition the rearrangement of the
clauses did not produce the anticipated effects.
Careful examination of the reorganized homicide statement showed that its
beginning, ‘‘Eventually, we broke off from the scuffle and realized that one of the
young lads had been killed’’, may have been interpreted as an initial summary of the
story, i.e. as the abstract, as defined by the model of Stein and Glenn (1979). It is
possible that this opening statement gives a better account of the actions than the
one used in the sequenced statement: ‘‘I was just trying to help out in a fight that
went wrong’’. In this case it is possible that the position of the component gives the
expectation that it is a summary. As such the judge attempts to infer the general
thrust of the account that follows. There is therefore the possibility that this provides
a form of anchor in the present homicide scenario: ‘‘Young menmessing around can
give rise to serious accidents’’. Presented later in the sequence this statement seems
more of an afterthought and therefore may not be taken as an integral part of the
narrative. In general it may be the case that in certain situations, a narrative clause
can take its meaning from its position in the text, rather than from the simple
definitions attributed to it in linguistic constructions.
STUDY 4
To test the possibility that the particular clause used in study 3 was influencing the
results due to its position in the sequence, a new version of the homicide scenario
was devised (see Appendix C). This scenario was still based around a fight situation
in which the criminal involvement of the suspect was ambiguous. However, instead
of totally reversing the sequence of the narrative clauses, they were randomly
ordered so that instead of beginning with the consequence it began with an initiating
event. Hence the non-sequenced statement followed the arrangement initiating
event(1), initiating event(2), attempt(1), attempt(2), reaction, consequence, ab-
stract, and setting. A different anchor was also used, which better reflected the one
used in the original burglary statement: ‘‘I know the trouble you can get into from
fights I’ve had before’’.
Method
Participants
60 participants (26 males and 34 males) were again randomly selected in Liverpool
City centre over 2 days. The age of the participants ranged between 18 and 60 years
(mean age 32).
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Procedure
Each participant was provided with a randomly selected set of two of the new
homicide statements, presented in random order. They were asked to read each
statement carefully and record their opinions of each on the plausibility scale devised
in experiment 2. No order effect was found so results were combined over all similar
statements.
Results
Results of a two-way ANOVA showed significant main effects both for sequence and
for anchor, as detailed in Table 5.
As displayed in Table 6 the mean plausibility scores of the statements show very
similar results to those for the burglary condition in study 3. The sequenced
statements were rated as having higher levels of plausibility than the non-sequenced
statements, the anchored statements being perceived as less plausible than the non-
anchored statements. The relative effects of sequence and anchoring are almost
equal, each contributing to around 15% of the explained variance in plausibility
scores. Together they create an even stronger effect than in the burglary statements,
the mean for the anchored, non-sequenced statement of 45 being below the mid-
point for the plausibility scale, whilst the non-anchored, sequenced statement
obtained a mean of 72, well above the mid-point. So, as in burglary, small changes
in the content of the statement and in the sequence in which it is presented can make
the difference between believability and scepticism.
It is therefore evident that both the inclusion of a criminal anchor, and a failure to
follow conventional models of narrative structure, can have detrimental effects on
the perceived plausibility of a statement.
Table 5. Two-way ANOVA results for homicide statements in study 4
Source df Mean square F Significance
Sequence 1 5280.13 25.03 0.000***
Anchor 1 5018.13 23.78 0.000***
Sequence  anchor 1 353.63 1.68 NS
Error 116 210.98
Total 120
Corrected total 119
***p<0.001.
Table 6. Mean plausibility scores for the homicide statements in study 4
No anchor Anchor Total
Sequenced 71.6 (15.2) 62.0 (13.9) 133.6
Non-Sequenced 61.7 (14.6) 45.3 (14.3) 107
Total 133.3 107.3
Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present studies have highlighted the influence of narrative sequence and
anchors on the perceived plausibility of suspect testimonies. It was found that
statements about theft or violent death sequenced according to the model used by
Stein and Glenn (1979) were perceived as more plausible than those statements in
which the narrative clauses occurred in a random order. When the suspect
testimonies contained a sentence that anchored the statement to commonly held
notions of criminality, they were perceived as less plausible than when no such
sentences were present.
These results show that there are circumstances in which the logic of a narrative
may not be the only basis for judging its plausibility. They therefore raise the
possibility of modelling the cognitive processes that give rise to judgements of
plausibility of narratives. These processes relate both to ‘‘internal’’ structural
constituents of narratives, especially the order in which they are presented, and to
‘‘external’’ stereotypes and belief systems on which an individual may draw to
conceptualize and interpret particular components of the narrative.
Such findings may be linked to classical theories of person perception, such as
that of Asch (1946), who states that how an individual is perceived depends on
inferences made about them on the basis of the central traits that they are known to
possess. Thus, replacing the trait ‘‘warm’’ with ‘‘cold’’ can radically alter impres-
sions of an individual. Similarly, the inclusion of a criminal anchor in a suspect
testimony (e.g. ‘‘I know the trouble you can get into from fights I’ve had before’’)
can have a negative effect on how that person is perceived, and thus influence
judgements made concerning the individual’s perceived honesty and reliability.
The relative effect of sequence and anchoring on perceived plausibility is also
important. In study 3, it can be seen that the presence of an anchormakes a significant
contribution to the explained variance in plausibility levels, but narrative sequence
does not.However in study 4, when the homicide statementwasmodified to avoid the
narrative clauses taking their meaning from their location within the narrative, both
sequence and anchor had an almost equal effect on the variance in plausibility scores.
Under these conditions sequence and anchoring can be of equal importance when
making decisions about the perceived plausibility of suspect testimonies.
An important point that emerged from study 2 was that it is not just the content of
the narrative clauses that can define how they are perceived, but also the point in the
sequence at which they occur. This opens up the possibility of important interactions
between thenatureof an anchor and thepoint in the sequence atwhich it ismentioned.
This highlights a number of aspects for future research into models of narrative
structure, and the effect of location on the perceived function of the narrative clauses.
The experimental strategy used here does appear to be a powerful, ecologically
valid, framework for studying the cognitive processes involved in judgements of
plausibility. Many of the details of the anchors used and the manipulation of the
sequences in which information is presented can be explored using this paradigm.
From such studies a more extensive model could be developed both of classes of
anchor and their influence as well as the implications of different structures. This
will facilitate an understanding of the ways in which judgements are developed
concerned with apparently logical, but inherently ambiguous, phenomena, opening
up further consideration of cognitive heuristics.
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Such studies have important practical implications. The experimental manipula-
tions studied here are open to conscious manipulation. In some cases these
manipulations may be abused and may be the basis of various forms of confidence
trickery. In other cases awareness of the power of these process can be important to
protect the innocent.
Of course, the scenarios used here were short and, unlike a suspect giving
evidence, or being cross-examined, there was no possibility of considering the
suspect’s demeanour or other possible paralinguistic or non-verbal indicators that
could be drawn upon to form a view of the plausibility of what they are saying.
However, there are many legal circumstances in which decisions are based upon
written material, sometimes even on summary statements about the facts at issue.
Nonetheless future studies using more extended material and other modes than
written would be of value. The variations between individuals in terms of age,
gender, and other attributes, such as attitudes towards or experience of crimes, were
also not examined in the present study. The paradigm used here is very amenable to
such explorations in the future.
CONCLUSION
This study has increased our understanding of the influences on judgements of
narrative plausibility and their relationship to both internal and external discursive
devices, i.e. the sequence of clauses within the narrative, and the presence of anchors
as external benchmarks, on which judgements of plausibility are made. The
successful application of an experimental paradigm to such research opens up
possibilities for the further use of such methods in the narrative arena, as opposed to
the qualitative studies that have dominated previous explorations into issues such as
narrative structure. This may lead to the resolution of problems such as that revealed
in the unexpected result of study 3, concerning the effect of position within the
narrative on the perceived meaning of the different clauses.
A number of practical implications follow from the results of this study. First,
support is found for the practice of protecting juries against suspects’ pre-convic-
tions, or other such prejudicial information, as these would surely serve as criminal
anchors and decrease the overall plausibility of the suspect’s account of events. Also,
the sequence in which a narrative is presented will greatly influence such perceptions
of plausibility, emphasizing the importance of presenting suspect accounts in
accordance with traditional models of narrative structure such as that used by Stein
and Glenn (1979). Similar issues need to be considered during the interviewing of
suspects. If during an interview suspects are continuously interrupted and not
allowed to develop a chronological sequence of events that correspond to such
models, then their account is less likely to be believed or seen as plausible. In court,
jurors have to decide which argument presents the most probable account of what
happened, and if they have to choose between two [narratives], they are likely to
choose the most plausible one (Baudet et al., 1994).
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APPENDIX A
Homicide Statements Used in Studies 1–3
Homicide statement 1: Sequenced—No Anchor
I was just trying to help out in a fight that went wrong. It happened late on Tuesday
evening when me and my mate had left off work. We arrived at the driveway of my
house and one of my neighbours had run up to us and said, ‘‘these blokes are
hassling some lads down the road, will you go and help sort it out?’’. We had started
to walk down the road towards the group and we heard a couple of blokes shouting
at these lads. One of the lads threw a bottle and things got heated. We went over to
try and stop the fight, but ended up throwing a few punches of our own. Eventually,
we broke off from the scuffle and realized that one of the young lads had been killed.
That’s basically it. I tried to stop a fight and things just got out of control.
Homicide statement 2: Non-Sequenced—No Anchor
Eventually, we broke off from the scuffle and realized that one of the young lads had
been killed. That’s basically it. I tried to stop a fight and things just got out of
control. We had started to walk down the road towards the group. We went over to
try and stop the fight, but ended up throwing a few punches of our own. One of my
neighbours had run up to us and said, ‘‘these blokes are hassling some lads down the
road, will you go and help sort it out?’’. We heard a couple of blokes shouting at
these lads. One of the lads threw a bottle and things got heated. I was just trying to
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help out in a fight that went wrong. It happened late on Tuesday evening when me
and my mate had left off work and we had arrived at the driveway of my house.
Homicide statement 3: Sequenced—Anchor
I was just trying to help out in a fight that went wrong. It happened late on Tuesday
evening when me and my mate were coming from the pub. We had arrived at the
driveway of my house and one of my neighbours had run up to us and said, ‘‘these
blokes are hassling some lads down the road, will you go and help sort it out’’. We had
started to walk down the road towards the group and we heard a couple of blokes
shouting at these lads. One of the lads threw a bottle and things got heated. We went
over to try and stop the fight, but ended up throwing a few punches of our own.
Eventually, we broke off from the scuffle and realized that one of the young lads had
been killed. That’s basically it. I tried to stop a fight and things just got out of control.
Homicide statement 4: Non-Sequenced—Anchor
Eventually, we broke off from the scuffle and realized that one of the young lads had
been killed. That’s basically it. I tried to stop a fight and things just got out of control.
Wehad started towalk down the road towards the group.Wewent over to try and stop
the fight, but ended up throwing a fewpunches of our own.One ofmy neighbours had
run up to us and said, ‘‘these blokes are hassling some lads down the road, will you go
and help sort it out?’’. We heard a couple of blokes shouting at these lads. One of the
lads threwabottle and things got heated. Iwas just trying tohelp out in afight thatwent
wrong. It happened late onTuesday eveningwhenme andmymatewere coming from
the pub and we had arrived at the driveway of my house.
Burglary Statements Used in All Studies
Burglary statement 1: Sequenced—No Anchor
The burglary was all my mate’s idea. It was nothing to do with me. I’ve never been in
trouble before. It was Saturday afternoon and we had decided to go to the park to
meet some friends and play football. It was on the way to the park that we saw the
house. It looked like someone rich lived there. It was my mate who suggested we
sneak inside and take a look around. I didn’t want to, so I started to walk up the road
to the park. He disappeared, then I heard the sound of breaking glass and an alarm
went off. My mate came running out from behind the house holding a portable
television. I begged him to take the television back, but he told me to leg it towards
the park. That’s how it happened. My mate was the only one who went inside. I
didn’t have anything to do with it.
Burglary statement 2: Non-Sequenced—No Anchor
I begged him to take the television back, but he told me to leg it towards the park.
That’s how it happened. My mate was the only one who went inside. I didn’t have
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anything to do with it. It was mymate who suggested we sneak inside and take a look
around. I didn’t want to, so I started to walk up the road to the park. My mate had
come running out from behind the house holding a portable television. It was on the
way to the park that we saw the house. It looked like someone rich lived there. He
disappeared, then I heard the sound of breaking glass and an alarm went off. The
burglary was all my mate’s idea, it was nothing to do with me. I’ve never been in
trouble before. It was Saturday afternoon and we had decided to go to the park to
meet some friends and play football.
Burglary statement 3: Sequenced—Anchor
The burglary was all my mate’s idea, it was nothing to do with me. I’ve been in
trouble for burglary before and I wouldn’t get involved again. It was Saturday
afternoon and we had decided to go to the park to meet some friends and play
football. It was on the way to the park that we saw the house. It looked like someone
rich lived there. It was my mate who suggested we sneak inside and take a look
around. I didn’t want to, so I started to walk up the road to the park. He
disappeared, then I heard the sound of breaking glass and an alarm went off. My
mate came running out from behind the house holding a portable television. I
begged him to take the television back, but he told me to leg it towards the park.
That’s how it happened. My mate was the only one who went inside. I didn’t have
anything to do with it.
Burglary statement 4: Non-Sequenced—Anchor
I begged him to take the television back, but he told me to leg it towards the park.
That’s how it happened. My mate was the only one who went inside. I didn’t have
anything to do with it. It was mymate who suggested we sneak inside and take a look
around. I didn’t want to, so I started to walk up the road to the park. My mate had
come running out from behind the house holding a portable television. It was on the
way to the park that we saw the house. It looked like someone rich lived there. He
disappeared, then I heard the sound of breaking glass and an alarm went off. The
burglary was all mymate’s idea, it was nothing to do with me. I’ve been in trouble for
burglary before and I wouldn’t get involved again. It was Saturday afternoon and we
had decided to go to the park to meet some friends and play football.
APPENDIX B: PLAUSIBILITY SCALE
FALSE TRUE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
UNCONVINCING CONVINCING
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ILLOGICAL LOGICAL
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
INCOHERENT COHERENT
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
INCONSISTENT CONSISTENT
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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IMPLAUSIBLE PLAUSIBLE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
UNRELIABLE RELIABLE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
DECEITFUL HONEST
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
UNSOUND SOUND
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
NOT CREDIBLE CREDIBLE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
APPENDIX C
Homicide Statements Used in Study 4
Statement 1: Sequenced—No Anchor
I was just trying to defend myself. It happened on Saturday night when me and two
mates were walking through the park. There was a group of lads behind us, and they
began hassling us, you know, shouting and swearing and calling us names.We walked
faster, but they started running after us. They caught up with us and started pushing
us around a bit. So we tried to tell them to get lost, and that we weren’t interested in
fighting with them. Eventually we had to throw a few punches, just to try and get
away, but things got a bit nasty.When I broke off from the fight I saw one of the other
lads lying on the ground. He looked pretty badly hurt and I realized that he was dead.
That’s basically it. We didn’t want any trouble but things just got out of hand.
Statement 2: Non-Sequenced—No Anchor
There was a group of lads behind us, and they began hassling us, you know, shouting
and swearing and calling us names. They caught up with us and started pushing us
around a bit. We walked faster, but they started running after us. So we tried to tell
them to get lost, and that we weren’t interested in fighting with them. That’s
basically it. We didn’t want any trouble but things just got out of hand. Eventually
we had to throw a few punches, just to try and get away, but things got a bit nasty.
When I broke off from the fight I saw one of the other lads lying on the ground. He
looked pretty badly hurt and I realized that he was dead. I was just trying to defend
myself. It happened on Saturday night when me and two mates were walking
through the park.
Statement 3: Sequenced—Anchor
I was just trying to defend myself. It happened on Saturday night when me and two
mates were walking through the park. There was a group of lads behind us, and they
began hassling us, you know, shouting and swearing and calling us names. We
walked faster, but they started running after us. They caught up with us and started
pushing us around a bit. So we tried to tell them to get lost, and that we weren’t
interested in fighting with them. I know the trouble you can get into from fights I’ve
266 D. V. Canter et al.
Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law 21: 251–267 (2003)
had before. Eventually we had to throw a few punches, just to try and get away, but
things got a bit nasty. When I broke off from the fight I saw one of the other lads
lying on the ground. He looked pretty badly hurt and I realized that he was dead.
That’s basically it. We didn’t want any trouble but things just got out of hand.
Statement 4: Non-Sequenced—Anchor
There was a group of lads behind us, and they began hassling us, you know, shouting
and swearing and calling us names. They caught up with us and started pushing us
around a bit. We walked faster, but they started running after us. So we tried to tell
them to get lost, and that we weren’t interested in fighting with them. I know the
trouble you can get into from fights I’ve had before. That’s basically it. We didn’t
want any trouble but things just got out of hand. Eventually we had to throw a few
punches, just to try and get away, but things got a bit nasty. When I broke off from
the fight I saw one of the other lads lying on the ground. He looked pretty badly hurt
and I realized that he was dead. I was just trying to defend myself. It happened on
Saturday night when me and two mates were walking through the park.
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